cc/W697-5NG2] ("[T]his week, 18
Senate Democrats sent a letter to the department's acting deputy, Michael Young, urging a reversal of the decision. A day later, nearly 100 House members sent a similar letter to President Trump asking him to 'immediately restore' the records. Eleven Republicans were among those signing.. . ."). 19 
See, e.g., Nation's Best Zoos and Aquariums Disagree with Decision To Remove
Online Access to USDA Inspection Reports, ASS'N Zoos & AQuARIUMS (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.aza.org/aza-news-releases/posts/nations-best-zoos-and-aquariums-disagree-with-decis ion-to-remove-online-access-to-usda-inspection-re [https://perma.cc/X2WG-ERU7] (reporting the statement of primary U.S. accreditor of zoos and aquariums condemning the blackout) ("Public disclosure of relevant animal care and welfare information represents our license to operate and is essential for ensuring the public's trust and confidence in our profession, enabling the public to distinguish the best animal care facilities from poorly run breeding farms and roadside zoos and menageries ... Step Backwards for Transparency, SPEAKING RESEARCH (Feb. 7, 2017), https://speakingofresearch.com/2017/02/07/the-usdas-removal-ofinfornaion-about-animal-research-is-a-step-backwards-for-transparency/[https://pema.cc/VUZ6-8EER] (raising concerns about the blackout) ("We believe the availability of data can foster an environment of openness and transparency about animal research. When information is hidden, particularly where it was once available, the public will naturally wonder why many stakeholders have cause for concern: the public wonders what is being hidden and why, and researchers must devote even more resources to combatting the public perception that they are not transparent."). 20 See, e others-made clear that animal welfare remains deeply important to the American public. When the AWA was passed in the mid-sixties, Congress received more mail about animal welfare than civil rights and the Vietnam War combined. 2 1 The immense attention recently brought to bear on the website blackout 22 -and near-universal condemnation of the move-underscore that strong public concern about animal welfare persists.
The AWA was passed in 1966 to address "the shocking failure of selfpolicing by the medical community" to ensure the humane treatment of animals used in medical research. 23 Congress amended the statute in 1970 to extend its protections to animals used for exhibition and the wholesale pet trade, 2 4 emphasizing that it was again acting in response to immense public interest. 2 5 The stated purpose of the AWA is to ensure the humane care and treatment of animals used for regulated purposes, 2 6 and it does so by requiring that those engaged in such purposes become certified with the USDA and submit to unannounced inspections. If the agency determines that violations documented during inspections warrant further action, it uses a variety of approaches, ranging from informal to formal. The "formal" enforcement actions used by the USDA to address AWA violations range from an official warning to a formal administrative complaint seeking relief such as monetary penalties, and license suspension or revocation in an administrative proceeding. Warnings are by far the primary enforcement action used by the agency. 2 7 The case study presented in this Article indicates that the USDA's use of warnings as a means of encouraging compliance with the AWA is largely failing-that the example of dog breeder Josh Souza is not aberrant. Facilities that received warnings were more likely to commit six or more subsequent violations than they were to commit zero to one. Nearly 40% of all facilities that received warnings were subsequently cited for six or more violations of the AWA. And more than one quarter committed one or more direct violationsviolations that have or are likely to have a serious or severe adverse effect on an animal's health and well-being-after receiving a warning. Given these findings, and suggestions in the literature that credibility is a key element in establishing the effectiveness of a warning, this Article also examines the rate and severity of subsequent enforcement actions for repeat violators of the AWA-i.e., what repercussions those who disregarded agency warnings faced. Again, Souza's example proves unexceptional: repeat warnings were by far the most prevalent subsequent enforcement action. In the rare case where penalties were assessed, they were discounted from the statutory maximum by 96.4% on average-that is, for every dollar in potential penalties enforceable upon these repeat offenders, they paid just 3.6 cents on average.
This Article reveals a serious enforcement failure. Given the prevalence of warnings as an enforcement tool across administrative agencies, and the paucity of information about their effectiveness, it is likely that similar failures are occurring in a host of other contexts. The Article concludes not with a call to abandon warnings altogether, but with policy recommendations to render them more effective in motivating compliance, with particular attention to the potential role of targeted disclosure, a particularly important issue given the recent trend toward nondisclosure and secrecy where disclosure and transparency were previously the norm.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses administrative warnings generally. It first establishes the prevalence of warnings as an enforcement tool and then situates warnings within the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical. The Article then aims to tackle two interrelated issues raised in this literature: the puzzle that warnings present to public enforcement theory, and the paucity of empirical analysis of the efficacy of warnings. It does so by analyzing the compliance behavior of facilities regulated under the Federal Animal Welfare Act following the receipt of official warnings. Accordingly, Part ifi provides background on the AWA-its scope and purposes, how it is implemented, and the various mechanisms utilized to enforce the Act. Part IV then presents a case study of the compliance behavior of regulated facilities following their receipt of warnings for past AWA violations. The analysis also considers the frequency and severity of subsequent enforcement actions faced by the high proportion of facilities that continued to violate the AWA after receiving warnings. Part V discusses the implications of the case study's findings for both the USDA and administrative agencies more generally, and makes recommendations for policy and further study. 
II. WARNINGS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT

A. The Prevalence ofAdministrative Warnings
As economists Timo Goeschl and Johannes Jarke have noted, "[t]he frequent use of warnings by regulators is an empirical fact in the enforcement of laws and regulations. Research on the activities performed by individual inspectors or by enforcement agencies on a day-to-day basis consistently ranks issuing verbal or written warnings to wrong-doers near the top." 2 8
Warnings are prevalent "across widely different regulatory areas." 29 For example, warnings are frequently used in the context of environmental law. 30 A study of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) enforcement of the Clean Water Act found that 70% of enforcement actions were informal "nonpunitive actions which involve only a notice or warning that a regulatee is, or may be, in violation of the law." 3 1 A 2012 EPA memo urged staff to consider increasing reliance on notices of violation and warning letters in the early stages of enforcement proceedings 32 
B. Theorizing the Role of Warnings
Warnings Under the Traditional Model ofEconomic Enforcement
The traditional economic model used in public enforcement literature posits that entities will only comply with the law "as long as the marginal cost of doing so is less than the expected marginal penalty. On this view, it would appear irrational for regulatory agencies to issue warnings in lieu of penalties, and we should expect warnings to have no effect on compliance behavior. However, as discussed in the next Subpart, some scholars have urged a move away from a strict economic model to account for other factors that may inform regulated entities' compliance behavior. These models, in turn, may provide a meaningful place for warnings.
Socio-Legal Studies, Responsive Regulation, and the Turn Away from a Strict Economic Model
For years, a debate has raged between scholars advocating for a coercive regulatory approach and those urging a more cooperative approach. 59 The coercive approach is premised on the economic model discussed above, which holds that "regulated entities are rational economic actors whose principal motivations include maximization of profits." 60 Proponents of a more cooperative approach, sometimes referred to as "compliance assistance," contend that regulated entities are not solely motivated by a fear of detection and punishment and that there is great value in establishing and maintaining a cooperative relationship between regulator and regulatee. According to this view, an overly "'sanction-oriented' response to noncompliance may make regulated entities 'resentful' and less likely to cooperate with regulators in the future." 6 1 58 Goeschl & Jarke, supra note 13, at 340; see id at 350 ("[Widespread use of warnings has] been identified as an anomaly within the standard theory of public law enforcement: As a first-order approximation, a breach of regulations should always attract punishment by an enforcer with a compliance objective, unless the enforcer decides not to pursue the offender at all. The use of warnings, which are costly to the enforcer and costless to the offender, is therefore puzzling."); see also Most analysts are convinced that both cooperation and punishment are necessary to optimize enforcement efforts. For these analysts, the crucial question is "not which enforcement strategy regulators should usecooperative or punitive-but when." Thus, regulators must "distinguish between 'bad' and 'good' firms.. . and employ the tools of punitive and cooperative enforcement. . ., thereby maximizing the virtue of each approach while minimizing their vices."
62
As socio-legal scholar Robert A. Kagan and his colleagues have explained, research has found that concerns about detection and legal punishment are not the sole factors motivating businesses, but are intertwined with other motivational factors, principally "concern about the consequences of acquiring a bad reputation; and a sense of duty, that is, the desire to conform to internalized norms or beliefs about right and wrong." 63 In their view, the traditional, rationalactor economic model oversimplifies the motivations of regulated entities and ignores part of the picture.M The reputational concerns that Kagan et al. suggest we attend to are comprised of pressures for responsible performance "from neighbours, employees, community groups, the news media and environmental advocacy groups," all of which "could generate adverse publicity." 65 These pressures are intertwined with and largely based on a foundation of government regulation and enforcement, which provide "benchmarks for criticizing firms that appear to have violated them." 66 "Moreover, by publicizing a violation, social license enforcers amplify an official legal sanction's impact and deterrent weight. Adverse publicity concerning regulatory violations can erode the 'reputational capital' that most firms work hard to build and protect." 67 Normative concerns, in turn, are described as "[c]ivic duty motivations, including the felt obligation to comply with [the] law" separate from fear of punishment. 68 Like reputational concerns, normative motivations also largely derive their governing standards and expectations from legal rules and a prospect of enforcement. 69 If the compliance behavior of regulated entities is motivated by a complex mix of factors, not simply fear of detection and punishment, then regulators seeking to incentivize compliance should attend to that mix of factors. As Ayres and Braithwaite have suggested, "Government should ... be attuned to the differing motivations of regulated actors" and "should respond to industry conduct." 70 ("When reputational damages stem mainly from formal legal proceedings, this can be seen as part of a deterrence strategy. However, informal sanctions also impose stigmatic, commitment, and attachment costs for managers who violate the law. These effects may be a direct consequence of formal sanctions or completely unrelated to formal proceedings. ...
[A] study of corporate offending intentions ... found inhibitory effects associated with the certainty of internally imposed informal sanctions (shame) and externally imposed informal sanctions (loss of respect from family, friends, and business associates). Importantly, the threat of both individual and firm reputational damage had an inhibitory effect. But these effects were independent of and tended to trump formal sanction risks (which were relatively unimportant sources of deterrence)." (footnotes omitted)). 
WARNING LETTER PERSUASION
With an enforcement pyramid, the vast majority of regulatory interactions are cooperative, but this cooperation relies fundamentally on the ability of the State to escalate enforcement-"[l]op the tops off the enforcement pyramids and there is less prospect of self-regulation, less prospect of persuasion as an alternative to punishment." 7 5 Under this model, "the greater the heights of punitiveness to which an agency can escalate, the greater its capacity to push regulation down to the cooperative base of the pyramid." 76 Also important is the ability to provide gradual escalation. As Ayres and Braithwaite explain, when agencies have only extremely punitive enforcement options-such as completely shutting down a business-"it is politically impossible and morally unacceptable to use it with any but the most extraordinary offences. Hence, such agencies often find themselves in the situation where their implied plea to 'cooperate or else' has little credibility." 7 7 Thus, "compliance is most likely Mungan has suggested that warnings may be optimal and socially desirable where individuals are uninformed about the illegality of the act at issue as they "are meant to give notice to or caution individuals who are presumed to lack information regarding a certain issue." 82 Used in this way, warnings can incentivize compliance at a low cost while also preserving a sense of cooperation between the government and the regulated entity, who may perceive enforcement where they are uninformed to be unfair, thereby "weakening the social ties between citizens and law enforcers."
83
Returning to Kagan et al.'s framework of the three principal factors motivating compliance by regulated entities, the issuance of a warning can have significant reputational and normative implications. If warnings are made public, they can generate the adverse publicity that firms try hard to avoid. This concern alone might motivate a regulated entity to avoid a warning even if it carries no true legal penalty. Likewise, if, as Kagan et al. suggest, firms have 7 8 AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 70, at 52. 79 Nielsen & Parker, supra note 72, at 377. 80 Lochner & Cain, supra note 77, at 1903-04; see also Faure, supra note 59, at 328 ("Criminological research in the Netherlands has shown that many violations of environmental regulation do not take place willfully, but rather as a result of a lack of information or knowledge. In these cases where companies lack adequate information, a deterrence approach may fail and a cooperative enforcement style could be more effective. This was also confirmed in a recent experimental study by Alpizar and others who showed that there are substantial learning effects, meaning that compliance with the desired pollution reduction targets is substantially higher in a second period when the firm was accurately informed about the contents of their obligations." (footnote omitted)). Thus, the enforcement pyramid approach allows for the existence of both "good apples" and "bad apples," balancing cooperation and coercion. As Shapiro and Rabinowitz explain, while regulators should cooperate with firms that attempt in good faith to comply with agency regulations, they must also aggressively punish lawbreakers that do not act in good faith. Such enforcement is necessary to deter firms that do not intend to comply and to ensure continued compliance by those firms that voluntarily comply. In other words, there is an enforcement paradox. An agency will not be able to engage in effective cooperation unless it is committed to aggressive pursuit of serious lawbreakers ... .84 Punishment, then, plays a crucial role; without it the system collapses. Warnings are effective because they convey a credible threat of future enforcement in the face of continued noncompliance. 8 5 Indeed, one empirical study found that "credible legal sanctions" are one of the single "most effective regulatory levers." 86 As the Supreme Court noted in distinguishing the mere availability of civil penalties and the actual imposition thereof in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., "a threat has no deterrent value unless it is credible that it will be carried out." ("Flexibility in enforcement can potentially compensate for the inherent inefficiency of uniform regulations when applied to heterogeneous settings. However, flexibility can only develop after a credible deterrence threat has been established."); see also MACRORY, supra note 49, at 29 ("[A]dvice and incentives should play a key role in ensuring regulatory compliance, and should normally be the first response of regulators. Nevertheless, an effective sanction regime plays an equally vital role in a successful regulatory regime. It underpins the regulator's advisory functions, and its very existence will often act as an inducement to compliance without the need to invoke the formal sanctions."); William L. 
. 88 Zinn, supra note 34, at 89 ("The firm may be deterred from remaining noncomplian[t] by the risk that the agency will eventually impose penalties, but that deterrent effect must be minimal where the agency consistently follows a cooperative strategy.").
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[I]f a regulated entity lacks sufficient incentives to comply voluntarily with agency regulations, a cooperative enforcement approach is not likely to induce compliance. To the contrary, the agency's failure to punish the firm results in its continued noncompliance. Unless the firm's incentives are shifted by the imposition of penalties, its managers have no reason to change their behavior.89
Further, "the failure to punish violators can lead to less voluntary compliance" by the "good apples": "If regulatory agencies fail to detect and punish violators, other firms will decline to comply because cooperation will put them at a competitive disadvantage with the noncompliers. the persuasive measures located at the base of the pyramid does not achieve the desired result, the regulator must be prepared to advance to a higher level in the pyramid."). 90 Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 62, at 724 ("In her examination of tax enforcement, for example, Margaret Levi stresses that active prosecution of violators is crucial because perceptions of 'exploitation' will encourage noncompliance." (citing MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 53 (Brian Berry et al. eds., 1988))); see also Kagan et al., supra note 63, at 52 (noting that one important function of enforcement is "its reassurance effect ('you're not a fool to comply; we are really looking for and finding the bad apples')"); McGarity, supra note 59, at 1278 ("Strict deterrence-based enforcement levels the playing field for maximal compliers who err on the side of compliance with the environmental laws. To the extent that they get away with conduct that violates the law, flouters and minimal compliers obtain a competitive advantage over maximal compliers that can be reflected in the prices of their competing products." (footnote omitted)); Scholz, supra note 85, at 443 ("The more mistakes the agency makes in ... failing to prosecute bad [firms], the less the incentive to cooperate."). 92 See MACRORY, supra note 49, at 44 ("[F]ollow up ... is of particular importance for low-level enforcement actions such as warning letters or enforcement/improvement notices, where I am concerned that lack of follow-up on the part of regulators means that they are not taken seriously and credibly by firms."). 
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93
C. Paucity of Empirical Data on the Efficacy of Warnings
Despite a robust literature on the relative theoretical merits of coercive and cooperative regulatory enforcement approaches, there is surprisingly little data on the actual efficacy of either approach. As Robert L. Glicksman and Dietrich H. Earnhart have noted:
For all the debate that the recent emphasis on cooperative approaches to assuring compliance with the environmental laws has engendered, relatively little empirical research has been directed at a comparison of the traditional, deterrence-based (or coercive) enforcement approach and the cooperative enforcement approach to inducing compliance with environmental regulatory obligations.
94
Numerous other scholars have similarly noted the paucity of empirical data in this area. The efficacy of warnings specifically is even more severely understudied. Despite their prevalence, we know remarkably little about whether warnings actually work to incentivize compliance. As Nyborg and Telle have remarked, "There is a considerable literature on enforcement of regulations, but we know of no analysis explicitly analyzing the role of warnings. The limited research on cooperative approaches generally suggests caution. Shapiro and Rabinowitz note that "[t]he policy evidence is equivocal concerning the extent to which such agency cooperation increases regulatory compliance. Other evidence, however, suggests that substantial reliance on cooperation may decrease compliance."9 9 Specifically, they suggest that "[a] mix of anecdotal and empirical evidence warns that cooperative approaches can decrease compliance if agencies permit law breakers to go unpunished." 0 0 They cite a Canadian study that "found that the same employers continued to violate health and safety regulations despite lenient treatment," 10 1 and an empirical study which compared compliance in the pulp and paper industries in Canada and the United States found lower compliance rates in Canada, which the author attributed to the fact that Canadian enforcers were more lenient than their American counterparts when addressing noncompliance.1 02 Notably, in both of these studies it appears that the enforcement bodies were not escalating penalties in the face of ongoing noncompliance, making it unsurprising that the noncompliance persisted and suggesting a need for close examination of effects of meaningful escalation and credible threats on compliance behavior. With this background in mind, this Article aims to contribute to the virtual void in scholarship on the efficacy of warnings. Given the pervasive use of warnings as an enforcement tool-indeed, often as the primary enforcement tool-by administrative agencies today, the lack of information about their effectiveness is astonishing. More information is urgently needed if our regulatory approaches are to be effective and efficient. Toward that end, this Article analyzes the use and efficacy of warnings in the context of the most 97 Eckert, supra note 30, at 234. 98 Glicksman & Earnhart, supra note 60, at 608 n.24. )). This study found that "fewer than one-fifth of employers with poor compliance records, averaging five or more repeat orders per inspection, were punished," causing the author to conclude "that the limited use of penalties is the result of institutionalized tolerance of widespread violations, rather than the result of the vast majority of firms being good apples." Id. at 723 n.40 (citing Brown, supra, at 83-84).
102Id. at 722-23 ("Another empirical study which compared compliance in the pulp and paper industries in Canada and the United States found lower compliance rates in Canada, which the author attributed to the fact that Canadian enforcers were more lenient than their American counterparts when addressing noncompliance. An Australian analyst came to a similar conclusion based on his observations of efforts to enforce mine safety and health in Australia." comprehensive federal law governing the treatment of animals, the Animal Welfare Act.
1II. THE ANIMAL WELFARE ACT
A. The A WA's Purposes and Scope
The Animal Welfare Act 1 03 is the most comprehensive U.S. law governing the treatment of animals. Under the Act, Animal Care, a subdivision of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), regulates the treatment of more than 2.5 million animalsl04 held at nearly 11,000 sites.
105
The Act has three stated purposes:
(1) to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment; (2) to assure the humane treatment of animals during transportation in commerce; and (3) to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the sale or use of animals which have been stolen.1
06
Originally enacted as the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act in 1966, the Act initially focused on the supply and treatment of dogs, cats, nonhuman primates, guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits used for research.' 0 7 Congress subsequently expanded the scope of the Act to cover additional commercial activities and categories of animals. Today, the AWA regulates warm-blooded animals-with some significant exceptions-when they are used for research, exhibition, or the wholesale pet trade, and when they are transported in connection with these activities. 
B. A WA Standards, Certification, and Inspections
The Animal Welfare Act requires compliance with minimum animal welfare standards. Entities engaged in activities covered by the AWA are required to become certified by the USDA and to submit to unannounced inspections intended to assess for compliance with these standards.
Animal Welfare Standards
The AWA directs the USDA to promulgate "minimum requirements:" for handling, housing, feeding, watering, sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and temperatures, adequate veterinary care, and separation 
.").
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by species where the Secretary finds necessary for humane handling, care, or treatment of animals; ... for exercise of dogs, as determined by an attending veterinarian in accordance with general standards promulgated by the Secretary, ... for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of primates, 11 6 and for "the handling, care, and treatment" of animals being transported in commerce. 11 7 These regulatory standards are set forth at 9 C.F.R. § § 3.1-3.142.118 The vast majority of animals are governed by what are referred to as "generic" standards, 1 1 9 while cats, dogs, guinea pigs, hamsters, marine mammals, primates, and rabbits are each governed by somewhat more specific standards.1 20
The Act also calls for additional regulatory requirements for animals used for research, including requirements intended to ensure that "alternatives to any procedure likely to produce pain to or distress in an experimental animal" are considered; to limit the use of animals in "more than one major operative experiment"; and, in the case of procedures "likely to produce pain to or distress in an experimental animal," to govern veterinary consultation, "the use of tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics," "pre-surgical and post-surgical care," "the use of paralytics without anesthesia," and the "withholding of tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia." 1 2 1 Relatedly, the Act requires each research facility to form a committee, usually referred to as an institutional animal care and use committee, that is responsible for conducting inspections to ensure compliance with these research requirements. 122 The regulatory standards governing these research requirements and the committees tasked with overseeing them are set forth at 9 C.F.R. § 2.31.
The USDA stresses that the standards under the Act are the bare minimum and "encourage[s]" regulated entities "to exceed these standards."l 23
Certification Under the A WA
The Animal Welfare Act's primary mechanisms are a licensing/registration (collectively, "certification") and inspection regime. Anyone who wants to deal 11 6 1d § 2143(a)(2).
7 1d § 2143(a)(4).
118 A few of the statutorily required minimum standards also appear in 9 C.F.R. part 2.
See, e.g, 9 C.F.R. § 2.40 (setting forth minimum standards for veterinary care). 14 5 See, e.g., FACTSHEET: COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS, supra note 133 ("Once the inspection is completed, the inspector documents any noncompliant items or issues that require correction in an inspection report and takes photographs as needed."). OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL noncompliant items, also referred to by the agency as violations or citations, including the number of animals impacted, sorted by the regulatory provision at issue.
148 A correction deadline is also generally included for each item on the report.1
49
The inspection report is also supposed to specifically note any "direct," "critical," or "repeat" violations. 50 "Direct" noncompliant items are those that "at the time of the inspection" are "having a serious or severe adverse effect on the health and well-being of the animal, or ha[ve] the high potential to have that effect in the immediate future." 15 1 For example, as explained in the AWA deemed "teachable moments" and noted on a separate "Teachable Moments worksheet" that is not part of the inspection report and not readily available to the public. Id "A teachable moment is a minor non-compliant item that: 1) the facility is willing and able to correct quickly; 2) is not impacting the welfare of any animal(s); and 3) has not previously been cited." Id This policy was reportedly announced at a meeting with dog breeders, by USDA officials who explained that the USDA needs "to enable breeders to sell their dogs to pet stores" and suggested that violations are "an impediment to such sales. https//www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/animal welfare/content/printable version/fs anexhit. pdf [https://perma.cc/ECB4-N4S5] ("If an inspection reveals deficiencies in complying with the AWA standards and regulations, the APHIS official documents the deficiencies and gives the facility a timeframe for correction. This timeframe is determined by the severity of the infraction and the direct risks to the animals' health and well-being."); FACTSHEET: COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS, supra note 133 ("For each issue that requires correction, the specific applicable regulation is cited, along with a description of the problem and a deadline by which the issue must be corrected."). As noted above, reinspections are required within forty-five days for serious violations. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. For other violations, despite the assignment of a correction date, reinspection is not required. In addition, for repeat violations that previously received a correct-by date yet persist, a new correct-by date is not assigned. 
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[Vol. 79:3 inspection guide used by inspectors, a heavy flea or tick infestation would be a "direct" violation, as would use of tranquilizers on an animal to facilitate public handling.1 52 "Critical" violations include direct violations as well as "prior adverse event[s] that had serious or severe animal welfare consequences to one or more animals, but pose[] no current risks to the animals," and, inter alia, chronic unavailability for inspections, falsification of records, and interfering with, harassing, or threatening an APHIS official. 153 Repeat noncompliances are two sequential violations of the same regulatory subsection.1 54 They need not involve the same animal(s) to qualify as repeats. Notably, a recent USDA Office of Inspector General audit found that AWA "inspections are not always performed consistently" and that, as a result, "APHIS may not be able to provide assurance that those exhibitors subject to inspection are in compliance with all requirements of AWA."' 55 C. A WA Enforcement
Statutory Provisions Pertaining to Enforcement
The penalties available under the AWA depend on the type of facility at issue. For violations by a research facility, the AWA allows for civil monetary penalties of up to $11,390 per violation, as well as cease-and-desist orders.
156
All other regulated entities are subject to these penalties in addition to license suspension or revocation. 157 For any statutory penalty, with the exception of a temporary license suspension of twenty-one days or fewer, the AWA provides 152Id at B-2; see also id at B-2 to B-5 (providing additional examples as guidance for inspectors).
153
Id at 2-9 to 2-10. 154Id at 2-8. "The 'Repeat' designation may be also be used if the section and subsection have been cited as a Repeat citation multiple times within the last 3 years, even if it was not cited on the last full inspection." Id; see also 2010 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 141, at 9 ("AC narrowly defines a repeat violator as one that consecutively violates the same subsection of the animal welfare regulations. This means that on successive inspections a dealer can violate different sections of the regulations without being labeled a repeat violator and, therefore, the inspector is not required to recommend an enforcement action."). 14, 2018) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 3). Failure to comply with a cease and desist order is subject to a penalty of $1708, id, "for each offense, and each day during which such failure continues shall be deemed a separate offense," 7 C.F.R. § 3.91(b)(2)(ii The AWA gives the USDA the authority to "compromise" any civil penalty 62 and instructs the agency to "give due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the business of the person involved, the gravity of the violation, the person's good faith, 63 and the history of previous violations" when calculating monetary penalties.4
Criminal penalties are also available under the AWA for dealers, exhibitors, and auction operators,1 65 but are exceedingly rare in practice.1 66 In addition, the Act requires the USDA to refer matters to the Attorney General for injunctive relief where animal welfare violations are "placing the health of any animal in 
161
The OIG has noted that the use of "court hearings to apply civil penalties" results "in an excessive period of time to assess civil penalties." 1992 OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 127, at 11, 13.; see also id. at 15 (finding that reliance on Administrative Law Judge system results in excessive time to remove problematic facilities from the program). In 1992, the OIG suggested: "APHIS should implement procedures which would allow for hearing cases outside the Administrative Law Judge system. Therefore, APHIS should request from the Secretary of Agriculture a waiver from the requirements of the Department Rules of Practice for facilities continuously violating the Animal Welfare Act." Id. at 15. For further discussion of these issues, see Winders, supra note 127, at 40-41. serious danger" or where an entity "is dealing in stolen animals,"
67 but it appears that this provision has never been utilized.
16 8
A WA Enforcement Practices
When Animal Care determines that noncompliant items documented during an inspection warrant further action, it has a number of options, including issuing a warning, entering into a settlement agreement, or seeking formal enforcement by initiating a hearing.
a. Warnings
For less serious violations, Animal Care may issue a letter of warning.
169
According to USDA enforcement policies, a warning may be issued if an entity is still out of compliance after a ninety-day reinspection, has accrued multiple repeat citations, is making slow progress toward compliance, or has been cited for a direct violation that has "no obvious effects on animal health or 
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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL welfare."1 70 USDA policy also dictates that "an official warning can be sent if no other enforcement action"-including a warning-"was taken against the violator in the previous 3 years."'71 As the example of the dog breeder Souza discussed in the introduction to this Article evinces, and as further discussed below, the agency does not appear to adhere to this policy strictly, if at all.1
72
The USDA considers warnings to be an "immediate deterrent," 17 3 and states that issuance of a warning "allows APHIS to address infractions in a timely manner, and facilities to improve their overall compliance before further action is necessary." 1 74 These assertions by the agency are interrogated later in this Article. The USDA sends a cover letter with a warning that includes the statement, "This notice is being issued at this time as a serious warning that if you fail to comply with the requirements of the AWA in the future, this citation and all past and future documented violations will be used to justify a more severe penalty." 179 The letter notes the maximum monetary penalty per violation. 
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Inspector General has repeatedly criticized the agency for discounting stipulated penalties so steeply that they are treated as a "cost of doing business" by the regulated community.1 86 Settlement discounts are calculated using a penalty worksheet that provides for discounts based on the statutorily delineated penalty factors ("size of the business of the person involved, the gravity of the violation, the person's good faith, and the history of previous violations"1 87 ). Beyond the fact that these four factors are weighed, "the penalty assessment process is wholly unknown" to the public. 88 The USDA has insisted on keeping the penalty worksheets secret on 
d. Judicial Enforcement
As noted above, although the AWA provides for referral to the Attorney General for criminal penalties and injunctive relief, such actions are virtually unheard of and the USDA appears to be violating the mandate that it refer to the Attorney General cases involving violations that place the health of an animal in serious danger or where an entity is dealing in stolen animals. 203 Approximately five years ago, the USDA announced plans to partner with the Department of Justice on AWA enforcement actions, but to date no specific details of such a plan have been announced.
Having detailed the purposes, scope, and implementation of the AWA, the Article now turns to a case study of the predominant enforcement mechanism used under the Act, official warnings, to assess its efficacy in promoting compliance with the law.
IV. CASE STUDY: ANIMAL WELFARE ACT WARNINGS AND RECIDIVISM
A. Background and Methodology
Warnings are by far the most commonly utilized enforcement action under the AWA, consistently comprising more than half of all AWA enforcement actions. In fiscal year 2017, more than 90% of all enforcement actions taken under the AWA were wamings.
2 04 Eighty-eight percent of the remaining enforcement actions were settlement agreements, while 12% were formal administrative complaints. To determine the extent to which warnings might constitute a credible threat, the case study also analyzes the frequency and severity of subsequent enforcement actions faced by those who continued to violate the law after receiving warnings. Thus, I searched all AWA enforcement documents published by the USDA to ascertain whether those who received warnings in 2011 subsequently faced enforcement actions of any sort. For those that faced subsequent monetary penalties, I also calculated and compared the actual final penalty and the potential statutory maximum penalty.
B. Case Study Findings
Rates, Types, and Examples ofRecidivism
The data set of all entities that received warnings in calendar year 2011 and continued to operate under the same license as of March 2016, when the data was compiled, included a total of eighty-nine entities. Analysis of the compiled data revealed that a facility that had previously received a warning was more likely to commit six or more subsequent violations than it was to commit zero to one, with a significant percentage-38.5% of those facilities that received warnings-going on to commit six or more subsequent violations. Moreover, nearly half of the warned facilities-48.3 0 /-went on to violate one or more of the specific regulatory subsections for which they previously received a warning for violating.
In one particularly egregious example, a Minnesota dog breeding facility, S G Kennels, received a warning in 2011 for violating three different AWA standards, including the requirement for adequate veterinary care. 2 10 According to available inspection reports, the facility was cited during every single subsequent inspection for repeatedly failing to provide adequate veterinary care to dogs.
2 1 1 Similarly, a Kansas dog breeder, after receiving a warning for failing to comply with six AWA requirements, including the veterinary care 
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OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL requirement, 2 12 also went on to be cited repeatedly for violations, including five more times for inadequate veterinary care. 2 13 Another facility, The Gorilla Foundation, where Koko the famous signing gorilla is held, had a similar pattern of subsequent violations. After receiving an official warning in 2011 for repeatedly violating the requirement that surfaces that cannot readily be cleaned be replaced when worn or soiled, 2 14 The Gorilla Foundation proceeded to violate this same requirement at least seven more times. 2 15 Indeed, during every subsequent full inspection, the facility was found in violation of the requirement. 2 16 Also concerning were a number of facilities that, after receiving a warning for failing to be available to be inspected, 2 17 continued to be cited for the same. 2 18 These facilities went for prolonged periods without being inspected, despite their history of noncompliance, and thus were able to evade regulatory oversight, which the USDA considers a critical violation. 2 19 The number of previously warned facilities that were cited for direct violations-those that are likely to impact the well-being of animals-was also alarming. More than one-quarter of the facilities in the case study 220 were cited for one or more direct violations after receiving a warning. An even higher number-thirty-seven, or 41.6%-were subsequently cited for one or more
